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International Rights and 
Australian Adaptations: 
Recent Developments in Criminal investigationt 
MARK FINDLAY* 
1. Introduction 
To empower the "right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according 
to law", Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights1 identifies a range of "minimum guarantees" for suspects under inves- 
tigation and for the accused at trial. Significant among these is that the sus- 
pect\accused is "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt".2 
Recently, however, the protection against self-incrimination, or the "right 
to silence", as it is sometimes misleadingly known, has been undermined in 
various common law jurisdictions despite its essential connection with our no- 
tions of criminal justice.3 In England, particularly, police and prosecutors 
have succeeded in law reform which would all but destroy the general impact 
of the protection through judicial inference.4 
The protection against self-incrimination may either be considered a privi- 
lege or an impediment to the just and effective investigation of crime depend- 
ing on the stage reached within the criminal justice process, and the agencies 
involved therein. Depending on one's investigation and trial perspective, the 
consequence of its exercise is alternatively viewed as a restriction on produc- 
tive police investigations, a barrier against abusive interrogation practice, an 
t The author recognises the important suggestions offered by Professor Colin Phegan 
towards the revision of this paper. In addition the research materials provided by Elizabeth 
Henderson and Benjamin Vonwiller were helpful while I was away from the luxury of a 
well stocked library. 
* Foundation Professor of Law University of the South Pacific Director Institute of 
Criminology Law Faculty University of Sydney. 
1 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) Resolution 2200 A(xxI). Article 14(2). 
2 Id at Art 14(2)(g). 
3 The right to silence in English legal convention has undergone legislative qualification and 
restriction over the years (eg, Thefr Act 1968 (Eng) s31, Supreme Court Act 1981 s72, 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 (Eng) s2, Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988), 
but these incursions have either been justified because of the extreme nature of the prohi- 
bitions enacted, or through the qualification of the resultant disclosures via limited "use" 
immunities. 
4 See Criminal Justice Act 1994. Interestingly this legislative position contradicts the com- 
mon law evidentiary rule that no inference of guilt should be drawn from the fact that a 
person has exercised their right to silence (see R v Whitehead [I9291 1 KB 99; R v Keeling 
[I9421 1 All ER 507; R v Bathurst [I9681 2 QB 99). 
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, 
embargo on crucial Crown evidence or a limitation on unfair trial testimony. 
Those who would enhance investigation and prosecutorial powers seek to 
minimise the "right" in both interrogation and trial situations. 
I The innovative ways by which Australian legislators have qualified this right, and the development of criminal investigative practice as a consequence of such changes are the concerns of this article. The resultant tension within 
more traditional crime investigation options will also be addressed. 
As the institutions and processes of investigation in present-day Australian 
criminal justice have specialised and diversified,s the general abrogation of 
defendant's rights has not been a feature, and the "balance" of trial privileges 
recently argued for in England6 is yet to find favour broad legislative beyond 
the preferences of police and prosecutors. The qualifications of the right to si- 
lence which have accompanied recent institutional and procedural develop- 
ments in Australian criminal investigation practice, it is suggested, provide a 
more particular and focussed revision of traditional investigative conventions, 
than a general abrogation does. The regulation of money laundering, organ- 
ised crime, and drug trafficking transnationally, as well as in other overseas 
jurisdictions offer instances where the Australian attitude to the protection 
against self-incrimination has been preferred.7 
The transformation of jurisdictional practice in criminal investigation, and 
self-incrimination in particular, within the international atmosphere of mutual 
assistance is discussed as the article develops. Transjurisdictional responses to 
the prevailing global imperatives behind criminal investigation are juxtaposed 
against a framework of international obligations designed to protect the rights 
of those investigated. Whether the tensions between investigative needs and 
justice "rights", which might be anticipated, are addressed through Australian 
legislative models appears to depend on the recent language of transnational 
responsibility for crime control and the politics of compromise. 
5 Findlay, M, Odgers, S and Yeo, S,.Australian Criminal Justice (1994) at ch3. 
6 In a recent speech to the Howard League for Penal Reform (14/10/94) the UK Attomey- 
General hinted that a new criminal justice bill, to be announced in the Queen's speech to 
parliament this year, not only would establish a new criminal cases review body to sys- 
tematically deal with miscarriages of justice, but that new requirements demanded by the 
police, for earlier disclosure by the defence of "any documents and other background in- 
formation relevant and necessary to secure a fair trial" would be imposed. Interestingly, 
news reports of the speech talked of the police position that the prosecution "has been un- 
der an unfair duty to disclose all its background documents with defence lawyers". The 
Attorney-General revealed a somewhat confused understanding of the defence role in a 
criminal trial when observing; "So far, subject to minor exceptions, the defense have been 
under no obligation to do anything of the same nature and the court and the jury have been 
left for long periods ... before they become aware of what the essential ingredients of the 
defense are said to be. This is not only wasteful of resources but it is also bad for justice". 
7 For a discussion of these issues in general, see Fisse, B, Fraser, D and Coss, G, The Money 
Trail: Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Cash Transaction Re- 
porting (1992); Anderson, M ,  Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of Intern- 
tional Police Co-operation (1989); Abadinski, H ,  Organized Crime (3rd edn, 1990). 
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2. The "General Abrogation" Approach to  the "Right" to  
Silence 
The neutralisation of the impact of the right to silence, through recent English 
legislation, represents a telling example of "law and order politics" prevailing 
over empirical reality and rational policy recommendations. Two recent Royal 
Commission reports have rejected the suggestion that the right to silence be 
abolished, and have expressed reservations regarding the appropriateness of 
judges or juries inevitably drawing adverse inferences about the reasons be- 
hind the accused's exercise of this "right". The Philips Commission report on 
criminal procedure in 19818 endorsed the protection against self-incrimination 
from a "rights-based" point of view. The Runciman Commission9 report, with 
its more utilitarian tone, failed to find sufficient reason in terms of efficiency 
or justice, to recommend a change away from the traditional common law 
protection. The empirical evidence before the Philips Commission established 
that most suspects did account for their conduct while undergoing police in- 
terrogation, and in a recent study only 2.4 per cent of suspects observed exer- 
cised their right to silence in such circumstances.l0 Therefore, the 
justifications for a restriction on the protection against self-incrimination re- 
late more to wider struggles over investigative and prosecutorial powers, than 
to specific reservations regarding the "justice" or effectiveness of its operation. 
It has been argued in support of the protection against self-incrimination 
that despite the statistically small number of occasions on which it is invoked, 
"it provides a safeguard for the vulnerable against wrongful convictions".ll 
Paradoxically, in the United Kingdom the police have waged a long and ac- 
tive campaign against the "right" on the grounds that justice is regularly 
abused through its exercise. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was 
specifically invited to consider whether changes were necessary in the "oppor- 
tunities available for an accused person to state his position".l2 The Commis- 
sioners did not support the police position that such "opportunities" be made 
more compulsory at the pre-trial and trial stage. Interestingly, in 1929 the 
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures proposed that the police 
should be forbidden from questioning suspects in custody at all because a 
right to ask questions might give the impression of a right to an answer, and 
onto the right to extract the "expected answer, that is a confession of guilt".l3 
Pressure in England for the abolition of the "right to silence" has not only 
come from the police, but also the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
(1972)14 and more recently the Home Office Working Group (1989).15 Neither 
8 Philips, C, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Command Paper 
(Cmnd) 8092,1981). 
9 Runciman, L, Report ofthe Royal Conmuision on Criminal Justice (Cmnd 2263,1993). 
10 Sanders, A, Bridges, L, Mulvaney, A and Crozier G, Advice and Assistance at Police Sta- 
tions and the 24 hour Duty Solicitor Scheme, (1989). 
11 Walker, C and Starmer, K, Justice in Error (1993) at 59. 
12 Above n9. 
13 Command Paper 3297 at par 164. 
14 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, Evidence, General, (Cmnd 4991,1972). 
15 Home Office Working Group on the Right to Silence, C Division, Report of the Working 
Group on the Right to Silence, (1989). 
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recommendation was based on empirical evidence, and they proceeded from the 
problematic assumption that suspects' protections under present law were in- 
creasing, or becoming unfairly balanced against the prosecution. 
Some points about the privilege against self-incrimination should be clari- 
fied prior to any consideration of the merits or otherwise of law reform in the 
area. First, if it is a right, then how can it be abused through its exercise? Sec- 
ond, in a system of criminal justice based on a presumption of innocence it is 
right that pre-trial protections should favour the accused. Third, silence does 
not mean guilt. Fourth, as evidence before the most recent Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice in the United Kingdom indicated,l6 most people who ex- 
ercise their right to silence do not end up being acquitted. Finally, the right to 
silence no longer facilitates the presentation of "ambush" defences.17 
The doctrine against self-incrimination has been a long-standing recogni- 
tion in British criminal justice of the sometimes tyrannical pressures which 
the State can exert against an accused person prior to trial.18 Even so, many 
judges would concede that when they give a direction to a jury that the jury 
should not draw an adverse inference from an accused person's election not to 
testify, the jury will go ahead and infer what it likes. As such, one might ques- 
tion the reality of the right, as well as the apprehensions attendant on its exer- 
cise, at least at the point of trial testimony. 
Rather than the compromise of traditional "rights" as an essential response 
to identified and unjustified impediments for investigation practice, or more 
generally the achievement of criminal justice, the issues influential over recent 
law reform in England appear to be: 
the political utility of old "law and order" chestnuts, at times when govern- 
ments seek to present a "tough" response to crime, and to satisfy powerful 
electoral constituencies; 
the "trade-off' or balanced approach to criminal justice reform, particularly 
when the police are actively promoting the reform agenda; and 
the desire of the police to maintain and expand their position of power 
throughout investigation and trial encounters. This is pertinent where a cor- 
relation is indicated between exercising the right to silence, and the presence 
of a solicitor during interrogation.19 
The form of the general abrogation of a right to silence under English law, 
and the procedure effecting it, also presents problems. The practical difficulty 
of how the "adverse inference" instruction might be delivered, and the scope 
of the evidence to which it will apply suggests a potential for injustice through 
irregularities or inconsistencies of application. 
16 Above n9. 
17 See Criminal Justice Act 1967 (UK) sl 1 . 
18 Compare its omission from the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) at Art 6. 
19 Sanders, A and Bridges, L, "The Right to Legal Advice" (1993), in Walker and Starmer 
above n l  1 at 37-53. 
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3. New Investigators and the Institutionalisation of 
Specialised Investigative Power 
Whether it is the spectre of organised crime,20 the threat of tax evasion and 
avoidance,2l the drug menace,22 or the epidemic of corruption,23 crime prob- 
lems of recent decades in Australia have often been portrayed as beyond the 
competence of the traditional criminal justice investigative agencies. Police 
investigation techniques are criticised for not keeping pace with the sophisti- 
cation of criminal enterprise. Intelligence gathering, in particular, is accused 
of failing to support successful prosecutions. And the old methods of prosecu- 
tion have faced accusations of ineptitude and parsimony. 
In addition, conventional investigation and prosecution agencies bemoan 
the advantage a suspect and an accused are given by the "right" to silence 
throughout the standard progress of a police investigation and the preparation 
of the prosecution brief. Despite recently introduced guidelines which qualify 
the evidentiary standing of admissions or confession of the accused, and judi- 
cial interpretation of their inculpatory significance, many appeals from the con- 
victions in criminal trials contest issues surrounding such materials.24 There 
appears to be little consensus between either side of the conventional trial proc- 
ess, about the extent and operation of general criminal investigation powers.25 
Today's crime control agendas in Australia have been heavily influenced 
by an official discourse which emphasises the uniqueness of current crime 
"threats" and the failure of traditional investigatory responses and prosecuto- 
rial results. For instance reams of reports from state and Federal Royal Com- 
missions,26 have portrayed practices of illicit drug commerce and abuse in 
such common and unequivocal terms that policing priorities would remain in- 
extricably tied to the "war on drugs" for years to come, if their findings were 
acted upon. Police forces in all jurisdictions have been implicated in the prob- 
lem because of their apparent failure to stem the tide of drug trafficking and 
despite a significant increase in resources for the task.27 Even their reluctant 
flirtations with joint task forces have done little more than expose the lirnita- 
tions inherent in state and federal jurisdictional rivalry. 
Such tensions, particularly within police investigations, are not new. They 
exist at many levels within all individual Australian police organisations. Ju- 
risdictional barriers have tended to exaggerate the problems of a free flow of 
operational information between investigation services. With the pressure for 
prosecution results against those offences which do not stop at state borders 
20 Moffit, A R, A Quarter to Midnight: The Australian Crisis (1985). 
21 Costigan, F, Royal Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dock- 
ers Union, Final Report (1984). 
22 Dobinson, I, and Ward, P, Drugs and Crime (1985). 
23 Temby, I, "ICAC: Working in the Public Interest" Currlss Crim Jus (1991)2(3) at 11-16. 
24 See McKinney (1990-1991) 171 CLR 468. 
25 See the debate over police powers presented in Freckleton, I, and Selby, H (eds), Police in 
our Sociew (1988). 
26 Williams, E, Australian Royal Commission of Enquiry into Drugs, Report, (1980); Ste- 
wart, D, Royal Commission into Drug Trmcking, (1983); Woodward, P, NSW Royal 
Commission into Drug Traffcking (1979). 
27 Bottom, B, Without Fear or Favour (1984). 
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(such as drug trafficking), traditional policing has obviously not been able to 
bury the suspicions of the past in favour of a less parochial and territorially 
limited policing perspective. 
The response of both state and federal governments when faced with the 
declared and baffling complexity of criminal enterprise in more "organised" 
forms, has been to concede the failure of the criminal justice system to go be- 
yond street crime, and to join in the rush for institutional reform. The political 
answer to public sensitivity over "new crime threats" has centred around bu- 
reaucracy and technology. Along with "novel" institutional responses to crime 
such as the Independent Commission Against Conuption (ICAC-NSW), the 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC-Qld), the National Crime Authority 
(NCA), and the Australian Securities Commission (ASC), Australia has wit- 
nessed new methods of investigation which Hogg refers to as "proactive po- 
licing and the 'information economy"'.28 
The development of criminal investigation through institutional specialisa- 
tion has been supported by a range of information-gathering powers. Principal 
among these are various investigatory options which reduce the availability 
and impact of the protection against self-incrimination. Yet, as with the rejec- 
tion of conventional policing structures and practices, when addressing the 
new crime agenda, restrictions on the right to silence in Australia are more 
purpose-designed than a general abrogation policy. This emphasis on special 
responses to meet particular crime threats works from the assumption that tra- 
ditional investigatory and prosecutorial methods have failed, and will no 
longer be remedied through the on-going and broad expansion of police pow- 
ers. The "balanced" policy of investigation reform has been rejected by Aus- 
tralian governments in favour of particular, specialist responses. 
Any responsibility for the failure of traditional investigation agencies loses 
its significance and focus in light of the new powers and procedural options 
available to these "purpose-designed" investigation institutions. Cohen identi- 
fies this trend as a "failure model" of criminal justice; wherein administrators 
and policy-makers accept failure and pursue its consequences; where a new 
bureaucratic alternative is justified not so much in terms of its own potential 
but rather as a necessary response to past failure.29 
In creating these novel crime fighting bodies, federal and state govern- 
ments of different political persuasions have agreed to suspend significant in- 
dividual liberties and hand over constitutional responsibilities.30 However, 
many such attempts by these crime fighting bodies, to address particular crime 
threats have been as conspicuous in their failures as those of the institutions 
which they were said to augment, or in part replace.31 
28 Hogg, R, "Criminal Justice and Social Control: Contemporary Developments in Austra- 
lia", (1988) 2 J Studies Just 99. 
29 Cohen, S, Visions of Social Control (2nd edn, 1987). 
30 See Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, National Crime 
Authority Bill: Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Af- 
fairs (1983). 
31 See Corns, C, "Evaluating the National Crime Authority" (1991) L Institute J at 829. 
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4. Specific Situations of Qualified Privilege in Australian 
Investigation Practice 
In the early 1980s a fundamental problem facing the Royal Commission into 
the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union32 in its inves- 
tigation of some sophisticated criminal enterprises connected with the Victo- 
rian branch of the Union was; 
... the complete silence of those involved and affected. Apart from utilising 
its royal commission powers the Commission turned its attention to making 
optimal use of a diverse range of other records that were publicly available 
and might aid its investigators ... [Tlhe really important feature of the Com- 
mission's approach to its task however, rested upon exploitation of the po- 
tential of computer technology to store, collate and analyse masses of data 
collected from these diverse sources.33 
The Costigan Commission through the use of an open ended approach to the 
investigation process relying on computer-based "linkage analysis" of crimi- 
nal associations, along with complex criminal profiling and matching also 
made possible through computer technology, was able to extend its focus 
from the misconduct of a few trade union officials, to complex schemes of tax 
avoidance and evasion, money laundering, corruption, and drug trafficking of 
significant proportions. The consequent picture of organised crime in Austra- 
lia which Costigan portrayed was used to justify calls for a more proactive 
style of crime investigation and policing involving novel institutional struc- 
tures with complementary specialist powers.34 Costigan was critical of tradi- 
tional policing methods which had a limited preventative dimension, and as 
such, were too reliant on passive and non-interventionist information gather- 
ing and analysis. Costigan argued that an appropriately empowered crime 
commission should target matters and persons involved in those concealed 
and consensual crimes, rather than await the complaints of individual victims, 
such as those which initiate more conventional justice intervention. Because 
of the nature and spread of the crimes concerned, the role of the victim\in- 
formant would be far less evident or effective, and therefore reactive police 
investigations may not even get off the ground. Why should the police await 
the next crime if patterns of criminality could be identified, followed, and 
hopefully intercepted? 
It is interesting to observe how a new approach to crime investigation, such 
as that adopted by the Costigan Commission, produced new representations of 
the crime threat, which in turn fuelled the push towards new investigation 
agencies and complementary, specialist powers and procedures. The narrower 
mandates of the new investigation institutions, with their more intrusive but 
more purpose-directed powers created specific environments of criminal in- 
vestigation in which both the powers of the investigator and the rights of the 
suspect should recognise the contextual significance of the particular crime in 
question. Traditional policing and prosecution agencies within an adversarial 
32 Chaired by Frank Costigan QC. 
33 Hogg, R, above 1128 at 99-100. 
34 Costigan, F, "Control of Organized Crime with Reflections on Sydney" (1986) Proceed- 
ings of the Institute of Criminology 29 at 10-16. 
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trial structure35 are required on the other hand to operate with discretionary 
and universal powers to investigate individuals without initial or essential re- 
gard for the social and political context of nominated classes of offence, of- 
fender, or consequent social threat and harm. 
Organised crime, corruption, and drug trafficking, now placed in more 
prominent positions on the crime agenda, are increasingly the concerns of the 
new investigators, and are examined with the help of specialist information 
gathering powers possessed by such bodies. The justification for such a trend 
rests with consideration of threat and harm which have not traditionally moti- 
vated conventional investigators. These crime problems are now regarded as 
requiring investigation technologies, prosecution expertise, and special court 
presumptions and penalties, unavailable or thought unnecessary for the more 
commonplace reactive policing styles. For instance, in following the "money 
trail", crime investigators in the ASC and the NCA are concerned to identify 
the material products of criminal enterprise. This is beyond the traditional in- 
terests of police who accumulate just enough evidence to confirm the individ- 
ual criminal liability of suspects. 
More important to Costigan than the securing of convictions, was the po- 
tential to identify the overlap between legitimate finance and criminal enter- 
prise. For this purpose, the criminal investigations by his Commission went 
well beyond the evidentiary needs of a successful court room prosecution in 
amassing information useful for civil, administrative and commercial litiga- 
tion, or wider intelligence-gathering purposes. 
The ICAC in particular, has been interested in making non-judicial find- 
ings of fact which while sometimes insufficient for, or not appropriate as evi- 
dence for criminal conviction,36 so influence the reputation of the individual 
under investigation as to interfere with their public profile or commercial fu- 
ture. Such information may not without legislative intervention be constrained 
by the rules of evidence applying to criminal investigation and trial, in that it 
may be used as crime "intelligence" and a tool for investigation, but it rarely a p  
pears successfully as a legal proof. By avoiding a claim to being justiciable evi- 
dence both its source and utility may not need to be revealed in the court-room. 
To some extent the "new" institutional and procedural responses to con- 
temporary crime investigation problems in Australia have become driven by 
the powers which they possessed, and as such are a part of a self-fulfilling 
prophesy for crime control. The crime threat which was said to be behind 
these new agencies was the motivation for a re-ordering of crime control pri- 
orities, and proposing expanded investigation powers. 
The new crime control agenda which emerged along with the development 
of investigatory powers and procedures adopted the language and perspective on 
crime and control promoted by these new agencies. Their common development 
35 It is interesting to note that new investigation institutions such as the ICAC, and the ASC 
rely on procedures which exhibit inquisitorial rather than adversarial characteristics. See 
Independent Commission Against Corruption, Inquisitorial System of Criminal Justice 
and the ICAC: A Comparison (1994). 
36 See Independent Commission Against Corruption, Report on Investigation into the 
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seemed mutually supportive to a point where one was soon seen as a justifica- 
tion for the other. Thus organised crime had to be addressed by a crime com- 
mission; organised crime meant a redirection of control resources and 
required an expansion and specialisation of investigatory powers; the crime 
commission becomes the essential feature of the new control agenda, and that 
agenda justifies the use of greater powers and demands the development of 
the commission. 
5. Challenges to the "Right" to Silence: Legislative 
Compromise 
During the 1980s the High Court has emphasised that the privilege against 
self incrimination is not merely a procedural or evidentiary rule but rather is a 
substantive legal principle;37 "in effect a constitutional doctrine, applicable to 
both judicial and non-judicial proceedingsW.38 As mentioned previously legis- 
lators can, and have modified, such common law privileges. Nevertheless, the 
general influence of the privilege remains in investigation and trial contexts 
where legislative qualification would otherwise not apply. 
The methods employed to limit the accessibility and impact of the privi- 
lege against self-incrimination in Australian investigative practice may be 
classified under one of two headings: 
where the suspect or witness is offered various immunities, indemnities 
or undertakings, by prosecuting authorities, in return for being compelled 
to answer questions or produce documents as requested by the 
investigation agency ~oncerned?~ or 
where the usual burden or onus of proof is reversed so that silence may 
either enable critical inferences to be drawn, or may represent a failure to 
adequately answer a presumption of fact or guilt. 
A. Use Immunities 
There can be little argument that the information-gathering powers vested in 
these new agencies present a potential challenge to the rights of suspects, and 
those under investigation. Qualification of the protections against self-incrimi- 
nation in particular, and the rights of witnesses before such investigations and 
subsequent hearings, the nature, and potential, and balance of these investiga- 
tions and hearings lean far more in the direction of the investigator and prose- 
cutor than would be possible in a conventional criminal trial. 
37 See Controlled Consultants v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 59 ALJR 254; 
Sorby v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 46 ALR 237 at 260-1. 
38 Corns, C, "The Big Four: Privileges and Indemnities" (unpublished Conference Paper, 
1992) at 4. 
39 It may be said that this is no difference from the information gathering practices of Royal 
Commissions. However, the investigation agencies in possession of such powers exist 
within Australian criminal justice on a more permanent footing than Royal Commissions. 
Also the terms of reference over which such investigation agencies may range their 
powers are usually far broader than those typically issued to Royal Commissions. 
19951 INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND AUSTRALIAN ADAPTATIONS 287 
With the CJC, the NCA, the ICAC and the ASC, reside the power to re- 
quire a witness to answer questions or produce documents which might tend 
to incriminate the person in so doing. The rationale for this is that these 
authorities must be able to investigate where the known facts concerning the 
individual or company give rise to a suspicion that they are involved in ille- 
gitimate, corrupt or fraudulent activity, or are being mismanaged.40 As these 
institutions are involved in investigations which are often beyond the particu- 
lar purpose of criminal prosecutions then the normal protections available to a 
suspect in a criminal investigation have been viewed by legislators as being 
not so essential. , 
The protection against the abuse of these powers, and the interference with 
a fundamental civilian right is supposed to be contained in various "use im- 
munities" referred to in the Authorities' or Commission's enabling legislation. 
These immunities exist because successful investigations in these contexts do 
not always need to rely on an eventual criminal prosecution. For example, the 
Queensland Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), has the power to abrogate 
the privilege against self-incrimination through compelling a person to fur- 
nish information or to answer a summons to give evidence.41 Section 3.24 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) specifically abrogates the privilege. How- 
ever, if objection is taken in reliance on a claim of self-incrimination the in- 
formation produced under compulsion is not admissible against the witness in 
subsequent civil or criminal proceedings except in charges of contempt 
against the Commission, or perjury.42 If no claim of privilege is made then the 
evidence is admissible against the person in any subsequent proceedings. At 
most the claim of privilege triggers a "use only" immunity. Evidence derived 
as a result of the matters subject to the indemnity and not acquired through 
compulsion, remains admissible. 
The lure of successful prosecutions might not be so great for bodies such as 
the CJC and the ICAC which can rely on the deterrent impact of public hear- 
ings, but the NCA sees such results as a measure of its success. Along with 
the ASC, the NCA has been criticised for not providing evidence sufficient to 
support convictions in criminal trials. These agencies identify the use immuni- 
ties as a major impediment in this regard. The Joint Statutory Committee on 
Corporations and Securities (JSCCS)43 examined the "use immunity provi- 
s i o n ~ " ~ ~  contained in the ASC Law, and concluded that the "the effective 
40 See Standing Committee of State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General (Eggleston 
Committee), Company Law Advisory Commi'nee Report (1990). 
41 Criminal Justice Act 1989 (Qld) s69,74 and 76. 
42 Id, s3.24. 
43 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Austtalia, Joint Standing Committee on Corporations 
and Securities, Use Immunity Provisions in the Corporations Law and the Australian Se- 
curities Commission knu (1991). 
44 The use immunity cited in the Corporations and ASC legislation relates to indemnification 
against the consequences of giving evidence by making the oral evidence, and in the case 
of s68(3) of the ASC Act the signing of the record and the production of a document, inad- 
missible in any criminal procedhgs. The legislation goes further and indemnifies the per- 
son against the use of evidence gained indirectly from "leads" provided by the answers to 
questions or documents produd to investigators. This is the derivative use immunity. 
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regulation of the corporate sector may include legislative provisions which vary 
the established common law rights available to the ordinary ~itizen".~s 
The Committee recommended that section 579(12) of the Corporations 
Law, and section 68(3) of the ASC Law be amended to remove the derivative 
use immunity provisions and that section 68(3) also be amended to remove 
the use immunity with regard to the fact that a person has produced a docu- 
ment. In addition they recommended that the use immunities should not be 
available to corporations. 
Despite the concerns expressed by the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) and the ASC that they are reluctant to bring a prosecution 
where the evidence may not support its success, Commonwealth legislators 
have not yet been convinced that such reluctance is well founded on the use 
immunity. The threat to successful convictions in the criminal courts might 
not simply be overcome by the removal of use immunities. Further, the failure 
of prosecutions while immunities remain may be testimony to the appropriate- 
ness of civil remedies above criminal proceedings in these situations. Such 
reservations are echoed in the submission of the Queensland Premier to the 
Committee on the matter: 
Any decision to abrogate use immunity or derivative use immunity clearly 
involves a choice between an encroachment on the right to privacy of the in- 
dividual, on the one hand, and the need to ensure that the Australian Securi- 
ties Commission is not prejudiced in the pursuit of its regulatory 
responsibilities, on the other ....46 
Reservations are further endorsed in the Committee's dissenting report: 
We note with unease the growth in powers given to investigators over the 
last decade. Their ability to legally tap telephones has been markedly in- 
creased. Financial transactions have been opened up to their scrutiny ... The 
state must look to order and good government but must not intrude unduly 
on people's rights in so doing. Were a trend to develop of allowing it what- 
ever powers it declared were necessary for the detection of crime, the sort of 
community we now enjoy would be devalued.47 
It is intended that the compromise effected through the compulsion to produce 
evidence, balanced against the use immunities over that evidence when 
privilege is claimed, may provide at least partial protection if the person 
subject to the coercive power is subsequently proceeded against in a legal 
forum. 
B. Reverse Burden or Onus of Proof, and Presumptions 
To some extent this technique relies on a similar form of qualification to that 
proposed in the more general abrogation of the privilege under English law. 
What does differ here is the specific nature of the inference which may be 
drawn from silence due to the presumptions which may prevail. For example, 
the requirements to prove particular offences associated with the proceeds of 
crime may involve presumptions about the sources of pecuniary interests, and 
45 Above n43 at 26. 
46 Id at 25. 
47 Id at 35. 
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the motives behind commercial transactions which, if not explained by the ac- 
cused, will stand as fact. 
The ASC and the NCA are involved in, among other matters, investiga- 
tions which may establish offences under the Cash Transaction Reports Act 
1988 (Cth) (CTR Act). If the transactions in question relate to the proceeds of 
crime, out of drug trafficking in particular, both the Queensland CJC, and the 
State Crime Commission in NSW might also employ their investigation pow- 
ers in order to support prosecutions under the CTR Act. 
Essential to the offence structure of the CTR Act is the "reasonable to con- 
clude" test.48 This test imposes liability in circumstances where, after deter- 
mining that the person is a party to two or more transactions, and having 
regard to other factors:49 
it would be reasonable to conclude that the person conducted the transac- 
tions in that manner or form for the sole or dominant purpose of ensuring, or 
attempting to ensure, that the currency involved in the transactions was 
transferred in a manner and form that: ... 
iii) would not give rise to a significant cash transaction; or 
iv) would give rise to an exempt cash transaction.50 
Thus the trier of fact could arrive at the reasonable conclusion necessary to 
satisfy the offence merely if the prosecution established the specified 
transaction, arguably without the need for mens rea to be established. 
Conclusions as to the purpose for the transaction would be drawn from proof 
of the transaction in the required context. If the defence failed to otherwise 
explain the transaction's purpose, or raise the defence of reasonable mistaken 
belief, if available, then the individual's silence on matters to which he or she 
is otherwise compelled to respond, may be incriminating. 
6. Divesting of Criminal Investigation, and Jurisdictional 
Sovereignty 
One of the most significant recent developments in Australian criminal justice 
is the manner in which traditional agencies of policing, prosecution, and pun- 
ishment are retreating from, or are having removed from them, traditional 
functions in the modem crime control agenda. Along with this retreat has 
been an extensive qualification of the traditional protections offered suspects 
under investigation. Certain new investigation and prosecution agencies, with 
enhanced powers and to some extent unfettered by protections of due process, 
operate in ways which do not recognise the traditional sequences of criminal 
justice. Investigations may produce evidence which is for purposes other than 
to support an eventual prosecution. Hearings may proceed as little more than 
fact-finding processes. Penalty may take the form of public disclosure, adverse 
media comment and community approbation without judicial determination or 
48 For a discussion of the f e a w  and dimensions of the test see; Fisse, B and Fraser, D, 
"Smurfiig: Rethinking the Structural Transaction Provisions of the Cash Transaction Re- 
ports Act", in Fisse et al above n7 at 172-98. 
49 Cmh Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) s31 (l)(b)(i) and (ii). 
50 Id at s3l(l)(b). 
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decisions on guilt. The manner in which these new agencies have changed the 
function and form of criminal justice merits particular examination, in the 
light of wider debates such as those recently occumng in the United Kingdom 
about the fundamentals of criminal justice. 1 
Traditionally, criminal justice in Australia has been conceived as a respon- 
sibility of each state or territory. Except in the instance where the Common- 
wealth has assumed the task of policing those crimes "imported" into 
Australia, states and territories operate their own criminal jurisdiction, and 
cross border crime is addressed through mutual assistance or extradition. The 
wisdom of this has been challenged by those crime threats which are so struc- 
tured as not to respect the artificial barriers of jurisdictions. Drug trafficking, 
money laundering, corporate fraud, and tax evasion have demonstrated the 
need for policing in particular to at least go on a cooperative footing on the 
part of each state and territory jurisdiction. Such developments have not been 
without their casualties. Federal law-makers have grabbed control of drug law 
enforcement through their customs powers. Joint police task forces have been 
constructed with strict operational limits, determined through compromise and 
economic expedience. And bodies such as the NCA have faced challenges and 
constraints from competing state initiatives such as the NSW Crimes Com- 
mission (previously the State Drug Crime Commission). Even so, the single 
jurisdictional approach to law enforcement in Australia is shifting in tandem 
with the new crime control agenda. 
With an expansion of criminal justice horizons within Australia, the politi- 
cal and social pressure to represent and control crime as a significant feature 
within globalisation is producing a critical phase in the development of crimi- 
nal investigation. This is a period of shared responsibilities, techniques and 
endeavour. It is also a time where the motivations behind new crime agendas, 
and the expectations for criminal investigations are challenging universal 
statements of rights and due process. 
An example of the transformation of criminal investigation parameters 
from the often jealously maintained jurisdictional limits of state policing to 
the transnational potentials of international cooperation, is the mutual legal as- 
sistance arrangements which the Commonwealth Government is currently ne- 
gotiating and enjoying.51 However the jurisdictional dimensions of 
investigation practice retain a critical influence over the operations of 
transjurisdictional cooperation. For instance, these mutual assistance initia- 
tives while vastly refining the investigation options available to both state and 
federal agencies, are still to some extent reliant on the requirements governing 
the obtaining of evidence locally. In this regard the attitudes towards self-in- 
crimination which prevail within the jurisdiction from which evidence is 
sought will govern the results and potentials of mutual assistance. 
51 For a discussion of Australia's commitment to criminal investigation through mutual assis- 
tance arrangements see; Bannerman, B, "International Aspects of Investigating Complex 
Commercial Frauds" (1992) Cth L Bull 18 at 326-33; Kriz, G, "International Co-operation 
to Combat Money Laundering: The Nature and Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties" 
i 
(1992) Cth L Bull 18 at 723-34; Stafford, D, "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal mat- 
ters: The Australian Experience" in (1991) Cth L Bull 17 at 1384-91. 
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[Iln Australia, self incriminating oral evidence compu1soriIy acquired by 
corporate regulators cannot [or could not at least in 19911 be used in crimi- 
nal proceedings against the person giving evidence. Absent a guarantee from 
the requesting country that the same protection would be granted to the wit- 
ness in that country there was, and remains, serious concern about the poten- 
tial scope of co-operation between regulatory agencies. Such is the concern 
that we [Commonwealth law officers] are now needing to look seriously at 
schemes which will satisfy the legitimate interests of both regulators and 
guardians of our criminal justice system. In so doing we will need to con- 
sider the proper boundaries of each scheme - the real needs of the criminal 
justice system - particularly, those related to necessary grounds for refusal 
of assistance, the protections which must remain and those which may be 
less relevant to a truly effective regime of international co-operation.52 
It is in this sense that those protections which will remain alive in local juris- 
dictions also depend on compatibility with international priorities which are 
now straining to shift responsibility for criminal investigation well beyond 
state and Commonwealth jurisdictional concerns, and changing the back- 
ground against which such concerns are confirmed or ignored. 
7. Transjurisdictional Facilitation in Criminal 
Investigation 
With the advent of international cooperation in criminal investigation, beyond 
extradition and the exchange of prisoners, structural opportunities to support 
new and global crime control agendas have arisen outside the more traditional 
institutional responses like Interpol. The form taken to enable these structural 
opportunities has either involved international treaties, such as the United Na- 
tions Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances,53 or bilateral or multilateral agreements like the Scheme Relating 
to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth.54 These 
arrangements have promoted: 
information gathering and enforcement across jurisdictions; and 
the development of networks to assist in the investigation and prosecution 
of transnational crime. 
The new methods employed as a result of the transjurisdictional opportuni- 
ties now afforded by such bilateral and multilateral arrangements involve the 
use of both formal and informal channels of investigation. There is nothing 
new about the informal channels of cooperation and these have operated for 
many years largely through the goodwill and shared interests of enforcement 
and investigation agencies. The formal channels however have come to rely 
on a legislative support framework within friendly states. For example, in 
Australia, so that its mutual assistance and treaty obligations might be given 
force, it has been necessary to enact a range of legislation which either di- 
rectly empowers local institutions and agencies to cooperate when requested 
52 Stafford id at 1389-90. 
53 UN document WCONF 82.15. 
54 Commonwealth Secretariat, London, LMM (86)13. 
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under some arrangement, or expands investigative strategies within Australia 
to provide a cooperative dimension.55 In return for such enabling legislation: 
The particular types of assistance which we [Commonwealth law officers] 
hope to eventually have access to in other countries include various types of 
information gathering orders, (such as production orders, search and seizure 
orders in relation to tainted property and monitoring orders), and enforce- 
ment in a foreign country of Australian Court orders (such as interim re- 
straining orders, forfeiture orders and pecuniary penalty orders). Subject to 
some exceptions the various types of assistance will only be available if 
there is a mutual assistance treaty or arrangement in force with the particular 
country concerned.56 
It is the information gathering order which is particularly relevant for our 
consideration of the tension or the challenge presented to self-incrimination 
protections by the compulsion to disclose backed up by use immunities. 
Bannerman talks of monitoring orders which he describes as "one of the most 
novel features of the 'proceeds' legislation and enables the investigatory 
agency to obtain access to a 'window' showing the pattern of movements of 
fundsW.57 While domestically there are limitations on the availability of such 
orders which relate to the nature of the offence under investigation, such 
limitations internationally may be the movement of funds into a jurisdiction in 
which such orders are not legislated for. 
Whatever the nature of the information orders and their availability which 
may transform investigation potential in a transnational sense, it would seem 
that the prevailing concerns for self-incrimination on both sides of the assis- 
tance relationship are significant. For instance, in the Commonwealth Scheme 
as revised, clause 8 holds: 
1) The competent authorities of the requested country shall in complying 
with a request under this Scheme use only such measures bf 
compulsion as are available under the laws of that country in respect of 
criminal matters arising in that,country. 
2) Where under the law of the requested country measures of compulsion 
cannot be applied to any person to take the steps necessary to secure 
compliance with a request under the Scheme but the person concerned 
is willing to act voluntarily in compliance or partial compliance with 
the terms of the request, the competent authorities of the requested 
country shall make available the necessary facilities.58 
And more specifically in respect of situations where compulsion comes up 
against the domestic barrier of protections against self-incrimination, clause 
19 states: 
55 Such legislation includes the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth); Pro- 
ceeds of Crime Act 1987(Cth); Cash Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth); Extradition Act 
1988 (Cth); Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 1987 (Cth). For a discus- 
sion of this legislative package see; Bannerman, B, above 1151 at 326-9. 
56 Bannerman, id at 328. 
57 Id at 329. 
58 As discussed in detail by McClean, D, "Revision of Commonwealth Schemes on Mutual 
Assistance in the Administration of Justice" (1990) Cth L Bull at 1408-18. 
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1) No person shall be compelled in response to a request under this 
Scheme to give any evidence in the requested country which he could 
not be compelled to give 
I a) in criminal proceedings in that country; or 
I b) in criminal proceedings in the requested country. 
2) For the purposes of this paragraph any reference to giving evidence 
includes references to answering any question and to producing any 
document.59 
Therefore the impact of investigative models which qualify the protection 
against self-incrimination may be inextricably dependent on a preference for 
i similar qualifications in a friendly jurisdiction, if transnational information 
flow is to occur to complement Australian investigation priorities. It benefits 
Australian investigators then, if such investigatory models are exported, fa- 
voured or common. 
8. Language of International Responsibility 
In a speech entitled "Australia's fight against crime: national and international 
initiatives", delivered at the height of Australia's transnational legislative ex- 
periment in crime control, the then Commonwealth Attorney-General set the 
tone for political discourse on such priorities: 
We must move vigorously, both domestically and internationally, to effec- 
tively curb these increasingly sophisticated criminal activities. First, we need 
to review our domestic legislation - both at the Federal and State levels - 
and if that legislation is inadequate, the defects must be remedied. Second, it 
is essential that we improve international co-operation in the fight against 
crime. National frontiers are meaningless to organized criminals who move 
from one jurisdiction to another in a matter of hours. These same individuals 
or groups have access to substantial financial resources, which pose an un- 
precedented challenge to law enforcement agencies both in Australia and 
overseas. To illustrate this point I need do no more than mention the notori- 
ous 'Mr Asia Drug Syndicate' which operated across many national fron- 
tiers and involved extremely large sums of money. 
It is not just desirable, it is now imperative that co-operation between na- 
tions is improved to the maximum extent possible. Otherwise resourceful fu- 
gitives will simply escape prosecution by moving around the world.60 
It is such representations of the nascent crime threat, and the urgency for a 
novel, transjurisdictional response which have driven both the moves to qual- 
ify self-incrimination protections, and to diversify investigation opportunities. 
However it was also the political rhetoric of new threat\novel response which 
has in part constructed the Australian Commonwealth Government's argu- 
ments over the past two decades for the activation of United Nations cove- 
nants on human rights through domestic legislation.61 While transnational 
59 Ibid. 
60 Bowen, L, (1985) 56 Australian Foreign Affairs Record at 985-92. 
61 For a discussion of the checkered legislative history of successive Federal govemment in- 
itiatives towards the inclusion and ratification of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights through domestic legislation see Caleo, C, "Implications of Australia's Accession 
SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 
crime has the potential to endanger the "rights" of nations and generations, re- 
cently in Australia there has been a recognition, on some sides of politics at 
least, that the absence of a strong or apparent local legislative base to reflect the 
aspirations of the United Nations Covenant may make the political rhetoric of 
rights protection in other contexts somewhat less convincing. 
The Australian position on the United Nations Covenant has always been 
overly conditional.62 In respect of Article 14 of the Covenant which has direct 
relevance for the protection against self-incrimination Triggs observes; 
No other state makes a comparably broad reservation [not to amend laws re- 
lating to persons convicted of serious criminal offences]. Several states have 
made specific reservations to specific aspects of Article 14 but no reserva- 
tion purports to cover a number of Articles as they relate generally to serious 
criminal offences. Even where states have made reservations to Articles 18, 
19,25 and 26 the reservations do not concern convicted persons ... It is in re- 
spect of this reservation that Australia comes closest to derogating from the 
object and purpose of the Covenant, particularly in relation to Article 14. No 
reason is given for limiting the rights of persons convicted of serious crimi- 
nal offences as distinct from lesser crimes and no definition is given of the 
term "serious".63 
It was said by Australia when ratifying the Covenant, its laws relating to 
persons convicted of serious criminal offences were generally consistent with 
the obligations expressed in Articles 14, 18, 19, 25 and 26. That may have 
been the case in 1980 but it clearly is not so now particularly with regard to 
the protections against self-incrimination contained in Article 14. 
The discussion of international rights in an Australian context has often 
adopted the language of "balance", not dissimilar to that which prevailed 
around the time of the recent Criminal Justice Bill in England. The line of ar- 
gument usually flows that the rights of the victim have been diminished by the 
offender, and those of future victims stand at risk from further offences. 
Therefore the rights of individual suspects and offenders might need qualifica- 
tion when balanced against the social harm posed by such victimisation. This 
logic has been prominent when the bail rights of persons accused of drug re- 
lated offences have been limited, when the usual conditions of proof have 
been reversed, and when search, seizure and confiscation conditions have 
been imposed. The removal of the protection against self-incrimination for 
suspects of serious criminal offences, and those who might bear witness to 
these has also been so justified. Rights, no matter how enshrined, become 
conditional in the context of criminal victimisation. Unfortunately the more 
immediate balance of rights against investigation efficiency is concealed 
within the potent and persuasive consideration of the victim. In reality the 
rights of actual victims may find little protection through investigation and 
prosecution practice. 
to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights" (1993) 4 Public LR at 175-92. 
62 See Triggs, G, "Australia's Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?" (1982) 31 Int'l Comp LQ at 278-305. 
63 Id at 300. 
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It is perhaps easier for international treaty obligations to be compromised 
in Australia under an atmosphere of competing political imperatives. Regard- 
ing Australian law, treaties do not have any legal effect in domestic law upon 
ratification or accession alone.@ Rights contained in international treaties are 
not enforceable in local courts unless specific legislation is passed implement- 
ing the substantive provisions of the treaties, although as the High Court has 
deemed Australian courts may look to the terms of an international instrument 
for guidance.65 The Covenant has been scheduled in the Human Right and 
Equal Opportunities Act but it is only to this limited extent that Australia has 
fulfilled its obligations to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant. 
No effective remedy for violation of the declared rights and freedoms is pro- 
vided and no procedure exists where citizens can have their rights determined 
by judicial authority. 
The contradictions inherent in the federal government generally endorsing 
the rights as laid down in the Covenant, particularly through the First Optional 
Protocol on the Covenant which involves the Human Rights Committee in 
rights violations in Australia, and failing to make these rights enforceable, 
was identified and criticised by the High Court in Deitrich: 
On one view it may seem curious that the Executive Government has seen 
fit to expose Australia to the potential censure of the Human Rights Com- 
mittee without endeavouring to ensure that the rights enshrined in the [Cove- 
nant] are incorporated into domestic law, but such an approach is clearly 
perrnissible.66 
And further: 
[I]t is incongruous that Australia should adhere to the Covenant containing 
[Article 141 unless Australian courts recognise the entitlement and Austra- 
lian governments provide the resources required to carry that entitlement 
into effect.67 
In 1973 and 1985-86 when Labor Governments made attempts to entrench 
the Covenant into domestic law they failed. The debate which surrounded these 
initiatives was not dissimilar to that which supports jurisdictional sovereignty, or 
a "balanced" approach to rights and responsibilities in criminal investigation. 
From the point of view of the Covenant and of the Human Rights Commit- 
tee it has to be kept in mind that the guarantees set forth in article 14 are mini- 
mum guarantees. Therefore, strict compliance by signatory States is required and 
a detailed account of the legislative and other measures taken to ensure the full 
implementation of all the provisions in article 14 is required by the Committee. 
Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant includes 
no general limitation clause designed to respect the rights and freedoms of oth- 
ers or "meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society"P8 All legislative and procedural qualifications 
64 Mabo v Queemland (No 2)  (1992) 175 CLR 1; Bradley v The Commonwealth (1973) 128 
CLR 557; Simsek v MacPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636; K i m  v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 
65 Deim'ch v R (1992) 109 ALR 385. [See also Mathew, above at 196-7.1 
66 Id at 391 per Brennan, Mason and McHugh JJ. 
67 Id at 404 per Brennan J. 
68 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Art 29(2). 
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of these rights, external to the Covenant, need to be appreciated against this 
unequivocal drafting. The provisions of Article 14(3) are not exhaustive but 
are the necessary, if not always sufficient, standards of a "fair trial" referred to 
in 14(1). While being limited to persons accused of a crime, and not necessar- 
ily relating to witnesses whose evidence might lead to a criminal charge or 
trial, the protection against self-incrimination is incontrovertible in the context 
of the  ovena ant.^^ 
9. Rights v Results 
Despite the protections offered suspects under the principles of common law, 
the rules of evidence, and international human rights conventions, recent leg- 
islative reform as it effects criminal investigation has demonstrated the su- 
premacy of crime control policy over a due process model of criminal justice. 
The Australian response to calls for greater information gathering powers for 
investigation agencies (in principle at least) has been to: 
recognise the failure of traditional policing; 
resist pressure for a general expansion of police power; 
create new investigatory institutions to colonize specialised policing 
concerns; 
empower these institutions in a manner designed to address specific 
investigation environments; 
inextricably link new crime agendas and new investigatory institutions 
with specific new powers, in the context of investigation for purposes 
beyond the mere exercise of the criminal sanction; and 
open up structures of assistance and channels of investigation which, 
while cognisant of Australian investigation legislation and practice, 
operate within a political atmosphere of international imperatives and 
local compromise. 
In 1987 the Criminal Justice Act (UK) created the Serious Fraud Office in 
the United Kingdom. This institutional development was justified using argu- 
ments similar to those which supported the establishment of the new investi- 
gation agencies in Australia. The Serious Fraud Office has largely assumed 
the specialist criminal investigation responsibilities of the police, and aug- 
ments the prosecutorial duties of the Crown Prosecution Service, in matters of 
serious fraud throughout the United Kingdom. 
The enabling legislation for the Serious Fraud Office has adopted the infor- 
mation gathering power model of the new investigators such as the ASC and 
the NCA; the qualification of witnesskuspect protections through specific 
powers, against particular offence contexts. In fact the legislation takes the 
process of specialisation somewhat further than the Australian model by 
sometimes narrowly defining the context within which certain significant co- 
ercive powers are to be exercised. For instance, when requiring bank records 
which may assist in later criminal prosecutions, an order may be issued 
69 Interestingly there is no cornpacable provision in the European Convention. 
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against a financial institution to produce the required records.70 It is an of- 
fence under the Act not to comply with the order, and the interests of the record 
keeper are to some extent recognised by the condition that such orders may 
only be sought under the Director's fiat. 
Therefore, along with the more general push from conventional policing 
and prosecution agencies to limit traditional rights of the suspect\accused, the 
more distinctive institutional and procedural approach to the development of 
investigation powers preferred in Australia has found favour in the United 
Kingdom, in situations where the crime agenda impugns the effectiveness of 
conventional criminal investigation. As with the investigation of money laun- 
dering, and the confiscation of the proceeds of crime in particular, Australian 
legislative models of institutional and procedural response have had a pro- 
found influence over the development of criminal investigation transnation- 
ally.71 All this in the face of international conventions which would protect 
those privileges now being specifically qualified. One may conclude that the 
pressures at work to develop new crime and control agendas operate beyond 
the discourse of international law, or traditional legal principle. It might be 
conceded for Australian law reform in the area of criminal investigation, how- 
ever, that qualified recognition of such conventions and principles has en- 
dorsed the legislative reluctance to entertain a general abrogation of the right 
to silence. 
70 Criminal Justice Act 1987 (UK) s2(10). 
71 See Fisse et a1 above n7. 
